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REASON, FAITH, AND MEANING
Charles Taylor

There are two connected illusions which have become very common today.
The first consists in marking a very sharp distinction between reason and
faith—even to the point of defining faith as believing without good reason!
The second is to take as a model of rationality what we might call “disengaged” reason. One illusion exaggerates the capacities of “reason alone” (allusion to Kant intended); the second sees reason as essentially “dispassionate.” Moreover, the two are closely linked. This paper argues against both,
while exploring the link.

1
There are two connected illusions, it seems to me, which have become
very common today. The first consists in marking a very sharp distinction
between reason and faith—even to the point of defining faith as believing
without good reason! The second is to take as a model what I want to call
“disengaged” reason. And these two are tightly linked.
To start with the first, since the Enlightenment, a notion has been developed of “reason alone” (I’m taking this from the title of Kant’s book,
Religion within the limits of Reason Alone). By that was meant, reason no
longer augmented (or disturbed) by Revelation. It was in that way explicitly contrasted to reasoning which operates along with, or on the basis
of, Revelation.
Obviously, the proposal to dispense with Revelation was something new,
but there was still an important continuity with earlier understandings. For
the Scholastic tradition, reason was capable of establishing important truths
on its own. It could demonstrate the rational nature of human beings, and
the ethic which should follow from this. It could even establish the existence of a Creator. But it needed Revelation to take us farther, for instance to
bring us the insight that this Creator was the Triune God of the Bible.
What seems agreed between pre- and post-Enlightenment positions is
that Reason and Revelation can be clearly distinguished as distinct sources
of truth. Many post-Enlightenment thinkers took over this conception of
the two sources, and simply discarded or denied one of them.
But I would like to argue that the vicissitudes of the appeal to “reason
alone” force us to depart more radically from this tradition. For a whole
host of important purposes, “reason” is not the name of a reliable source
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offering univocal and reliable answers; and “Revelation” itself is a category by which we try, rationally, to make sense of the truths we discern.
I have just said that “reason” doesn’t offer univocal and reliable answers
in a number of domains. But there are some in which it seems to come very
close to this. Let’s look at these, because they provide the basis on which the
belief in “reason alone” has been grounded. (A) Reason gets pretty close to
univocal validity when it comes to the kind of reasoning whose rules are
codified in formal logic and mathematics. And we might see (B) the discovery of reliable truth in natural science as a fruit of reason. Being rational
here involves applying a correct method; we painstakingly validate our
observations; and then we infer from them to the best explanation.
But while the Vienna positivists in their heyday may have thought that
this suffices to generate valid scientific theories, the reflections of philosophers of science like Canguilhem and Thomas Kuhn have shown us that
we need more. Good explanation—and then the further rational discovery
which this enables—depends on (C) an adequate conceptualization. Our
explanations can improve radically with a shift in what Kuhn called our
“paradigms.” As well as painstaking observation (1), and explanatory inferences (2), we need the exercise of (3) the theoretical imagination which
enables us to reframe our questions. Sometimes our grasp of some domain
remains very incomplete, and full of unexplained anomalies, until we transform our understanding of the crucial questions through a paradigm shift.
One famous example can suffice to illustrate this. Post-Galilean mechanics arose through shifting the crucial question. According to the Aristotelian mechanics which had dominated for centuries, in order to explain
the continued motion of a projectile after it has left the hand (or the cannon mouth), one had to find some agency which went on propelling it. All
motion required a motor force contemporary with it. The crucial question
was: what causes continuing movement? Various candidates were proposed which all proved unsatisfactory. Continued motion remained an
anomaly. The adoption of the inertial perspective changed the question;
now it was: what causes changes in velocity? At once it became possible to
make sense of the whole domain of imparted motion. The anomalies were
explained and thus overcome.
Reason in this domain of natural science must include this third dimension, a creative recasting of the problem, which can’t be “delivered”
through a reliable pre-existing method. It requires something in the nature
of insight, which can be validated, but only afterwards, through the overcoming of anomalies. Now in the domain of natural science, this doesn’t
seem to exclude our arriving at solid and agreed conclusions. Because
even if the new insights can’t be generated at will, and we may labour
a long time before someone hits on them, we can generally agree which
paradigm shifts have been valid. These impose themselves because they
resolve the anomalies which earlier theories generated, without creating
equally difficult ones in their place. This kind of progress can thus be credited to “reason alone.”
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We should note, however, that this happy result is only possible through
a stringent form of self-restriction; “scientific” language in the meaning of
the act must be purged of all reference to its significance for us; it must be
used to make “literal” claims, in a sense which excludes metaphor, except
those which can be “cashed out” quite “literally.” It is a special “insulated”
form of expression.1
But when we come to those issues in which the explanation and evaluation of human life is at issue; when we come, for instance, to ethics, political
theory, social science, history, literature, philosophy, aesthetics, and the like,
we are in a very different predicament. “Insulated” language is no longer
adequate. New creations of our theoretical imagination (we might call this
our “moral-anthropological imagination”) are not lacking. But we find it
very difficult to arrive at the kind of universal consensus which we at least
approach in natural science. On the contrary, people of different cultures,
different ethical outlooks, different aesthetic and moral intuitions, adopt
very different paradigms for their accounts of human action and the nature
of our moral life; and they cannot easily convince each other, or converge
on a favoured view, except in certain milieux and often for a limited time.
Faced with this disagreement, some conclude to relativism, and claim
that there is no fact of the matter. Human nature is shaped by the interpretations we offer of it, and there is no given basis on which we must eventually converge. I haven’t got the space to argue this here, but this inference
doesn’t convince me. We don’t need to assume that there is no fact of the
matter. Continued disagreement springs rather from this profound connection between the explanatory paradigms we find convincing in explaining human life, on one hand, and our moral and aesthetic, or spiritual sensibility, on the other. It is very often extremely difficult even to understand
each other when we are arguing over a significant gap in spiritual outlook,
and actually changing someone’s mind may involve a thoroughgoing reorientation of his/her spiritual life, and not simply a punctual shift in a
particular opinion which leaves the rest of his/her being unchanged.
An example may help clarify this. Take a widespread paradigm (alas)
in social science today, that based on rational choice theory. The affinity
with the ethical theory we call utilitarianism is fairly evident, and both
share a faith in a kind of transparent rational grasp of our motivations and
moral predicament, which others (myself included) believe is bought at
the expense of a considerable distortion of human experience. The attraction of the explanatory account is obviously linked to the attraction of this
construal of the human moral predicament, and both express the powerful draw of a certain notion of rationality. You need a big change in your
stance towards the world to get out of this pervasive construal.2
See Nicholas Lash, Theology for Pilgrims (University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 30–33.
This wide gap in the understanding of what is at stake can be seen in the public arguments which have been sparked by Angry Atheists. The God denounced by Dawkins, Hitchens, etc. doesn’t seem to bear a close relation to the God of Abraham that Christians, Jews,
etc. worship.
1
2
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So I would like to claim that there is a truth of the matter underlying
this kind of dispute; I would like also to say that we can reason about it; for
instance we can debate which view really makes sense of human action,
and put rational choice theory under severe strain when it is confronted
with certain human actions in history. We can also show a rational path
from one to another moral construal, by demonstrating how the better
account can free us to take account of important things which the inferior
one was blocking out.3
But I can’t argue this here.4 I would like rather to say what this means
for our understanding of reason. What this means is that our reasoning always involves a third dimension, beyond accurate observation and reliable
inference, namely what I called “theoretical imagination” in connection
with natural science, and what we could call the “moral-anthropological
imagination” in relation to human affairs. Reason has, in other words, a
creative component; it can and must generate new ways of conceiving
the reality it is trying to understand. How do we generate these? There
is no standard answer, no sure method, but in general we can say that
we do so by articulating what start as barely definable hunches, or inchoate insights. These unformed insights draw us strongly; we are willing to
engage our attention very deeply in them. We have an as yet unfounded
and nonetheless powerful anticipatory confidence in them; we might even
speak of this as a kind of faith.
Fides quaerens intellectum: it may seem shocking to invoke this formula in a discussion of scientific paradigms. But I believe that there is
a distant but discernible analogy with the theological. There is, in other
words, a similarity of structure which can be discerned in all uses of
the imagination which leap ahead of and set the path for more certain
knowledge. Of course, this structure is visible in an impoverished mode
in the scientific “hunch.” The impoverishment resides in the fact that
the act of faith is not in the general case in God, in the love and fidelity
of one (a Being? but God is not really a Being) who is capable of these.
And correspondingly, our faith emerges from and is nourished by our
whole sense of what is of ultimate importance in life, whereas the scientific hunch relates to a much more circumscribed area. Thus one can say
that the faith in God which seeks intellectual expression defines a direction for the intellect only because and to the extent that this faith gives
a direction to our whole being. But nevertheless a loose analogy holds.
The dawning sense of a new paradigm leaps ahead of what we know,
and defines the direction of further enquiry which aims to clarify what
draws us to it.
3
I have argued this point at greater length in “Explanation and Practical Reason,” in Philosophical Arguments (Harvard University Press, 1995).
4
In fact one recurring theme of the “adventures” of reason since the Enlightenment has
been the flip-over whereby the exaggerated hopes for certain knowledge reposed in one or
another method generate a far-reaching skepticism or relativism once it becomes clear that
they cannot be met. This theme deserved much fuller treatment than I can give it here.
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This richer notion of reason has often been neglected or forgotten in
recent Centuries, but it returns us to Plato. His “logos,” which we translate
“reason,” involves the articulation in words of insight, whose full nature
can nevertheless not be fully communicated in words. Reason cannot be
simply reduced to explicit reasoning, the methodical rational operations
which we carry out on our already articulated insights.
It was Descartes among others who caused us to lose this broader understanding of reason. Descartes held that reasoning could be from start to
finish guided tightly by a defined method. He had no place for the notion
that reasoning relies on articulations, which then only justify themselves,
if they ever do so, post factum, by the sense they manage to make of the
reality under study. These articulations transform our understanding. So
much so, that even the kind of sense we end up making may be undreamt
of before the articulation is made.5
The path through reason to truth inevitably involves a phase of nearblind groping which only later may be ratified in the clarity of the sensemaking that ensues. There are two facets to this ratification. The first
comes from the clarity of the sense we make, which each one of us may
experience for ourselves. The second comes from the general agreement of
all those engaged in reasoning, that we have really made sense of things.
Because reasoning is something we don’t only do alone, but which also
inescapably involves dialogical collaboration and exchange, these two
facets can never be wholly separated from each other. Descartes not only
neglected this interplay of groping and ratification, but he supposed the
ratification as self-authenticating in the certainty of clarity and distinctness. The dialogical dimension dropped from sight altogether.
Of course, this two-step understanding of reason, moving from articulation to ratification, gives just the most general, abstract form of its progress. This notion has to be augmented and enriched as soon as we think of
reasoning as situated in a tradition. I will return to this below.
But for the moment, we should ask: What does this understanding of
reasoning do to the post-Enlightenment notion of “reason alone”? In fact,
it makes it very problematic to say the least. If reason alone is defined in
opposition to faith, then it threatens to collapse as a category when we see
the role that faith in our inchoate insights must play. If it is opposed to revelation, then the problem is that “revelation” is a category which we come
to articulate in order to make sense of our most fundamental insights. It is
itself the fruit of reason-as-articulation.
Maybe we can salvage a category of reason alone as what is operative
in certain everyday reasonings as well as in natural science (the categories that Vienna positivists were willing to declare as free from metaphysics). We can say that once the inchoate insight has been articulated in a
new paradigm, and once this paradigm shift is ratified through the sense
5
The importance of such articulations is central to Gadamer’s critique of the omnicompetence of “method.” See his Truth and Method (New York, 1975).
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it enables us to make of things, the element of faith is transcended. But
for this very reason, the category can’t apply to that whole domain which
I outlined above where the anthropological-moral imagination is everactive. On the contrary, in this domain ratification is never clear without
zones of puzzlement and obscurity, and in the dialogical dimension it
never comes close to generalized assent.
2
So we begin to see how the too simple separation of reason and faith
comes unstuck. It does, indeed, seem to hold in certain domains, for instance, in mathematics and natural science. But once we step beyond
these, it breaks down.
Now this begins to make clear the connection of this first error with the
second, the belief that reason must be disengaged. The domains in which
reason can easily seem to dispense with faith are the privileged fields of
disengaged reason. By that I mean a reasoning which in no way draws
insight from the significances things have for us as embodied, social beings, who mark moral or aesthetic distinctions in things and actions. This
prescinding from life meanings was the essential founding step of modern
post-Galilean, Post-Baconian natural science. This natural science can be
convincing to everyone, regardless of culture, because its explanations recur to factors which are not defined by their meanings for us, but simply
by their efficient-causal relations. Descartes for his part defines clear and
distinct perception as a disembodied grasp of things, where our normal
grasp of them as embodied beings counts as obscure and confused. Our
seeing the colour in the object, our sensing the pain in the tooth, these are
obscure and confused; to objectify the process, and to see the pain as arising from some pathology in the tooth is to see things clearly.6
Now it is true that even in these domains, our hunches are often given
force by their elegance and simplicity, and mathematicians’ intuitions can
be drawn to what they see as beautiful forms. But the objects studied in
each case have to be defined without reference to these meanings.
When , however, we come to the domains I mentioned above, including
ethics, history, social science, literature, this kind of disengagement is impossible. How do we come to understand the emotions and reactions, the
sense of beauty and the good, whether of another person, or of a strange
society, without drawing on our own reactions? This may sound strange,
because precisely in the case of cultures very different from ours, the easiest and most damaging mistake will often be to see them as operating
out of the same gamut of possible emotions and reactions as we do. This
will often make them come out as espousing the worse rather than the
better, as being rude rather than refined, as addicted to pleasure rather
than disciplined, as pagans worshipping the devil rather than revering the
6
See Meditations III, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (A&T)
(Paris: Vrin, 1973), vol IX-1, p. 34; and also Principles I.68 in A&T IX-2, p. 56.
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true God, etc. And it is almost always the case that these too ethnocentric
perceptions are misreadings, and we have to come somehow to see these
other cultures in their difference.
But precisely, this can’t be done simply by setting aside our own reactions, and studying this alien group “dispassionately.” We can’t just
neutralize our expectations, because that doesn’t help us understand. To
observe these people outside of any frame of human meaning is to see
them as another animal species, opaque and enigmatic. True, our expectations make their behavior puzzling, and we have to get far enough to see
that these expectations are wrong. But the only way beyond them is to go
deeper into the puzzlement they awaken in us, to live in and analyze this
until a liberating insight comes into where the differences lie. This kind of
science can only be done while one “inhabits” the meanings things have
for us, rather than by disengaging from them.
We come to a similar conclusion when we look at what it is to make
headway in ethical or spiritual insight. We ask ourselves what is really
important in human life, for instance. Or we ask ourselves whether our
spiritual life shouldn’t take a new direction. We can explore this kind
of question only through our own sense of what is important, or where
spiritual growth lies. Again, this sounds paradoxical, because we want
precisely to grow when we ask these questions. So surely we need to set
aside our present intuitions? And in one sense, this is true, but in another
important sense, not.
We may indeed ask other people to guide us, or read books to get other
points of view, but what we are trying to do here is to educate our sense of
what is really important; we are not simply bracketing it and studying the
question dispassionately. And indeed, what will help convince us that we
are making headway is a changed insight into what is important, but this
is also something that we feel. Such insights are not in the nature of things
purely dispassionate. When we might want to use this term, it is because
we sense that it is taking us beyond some passions, those for instance of
narcissistic ego-satisfaction, not that we are coming to a pure, emotionfree perception of the meanings of things.
Such moments do exist—when we have a fleeting insight, for instance,
that we are living on a much lower plane than we need to. But these are
exceptional moments. Normally, our sense that X is important ethically is
inseparable from our feeling its importance, from admiring those who follow it, for instance; or being inspired by it; or feeling relieved and grateful
that this exists as a human possibility.
In other words, the perception of significance, of human meanings,
can’t be detached from the experiencing of these meanings, an experience
which can only be rarely and fleetingly indifferent. We grasp these meanings through our partiality to them. To such a point that we can often say,
with Plato, that one hasn’t really understood the good unless one is drawn
to it; unless one loves it—though one may be driven, and also drawn to
incompatible ends.
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This is what the disciples at Emmaus knew, when they said to themselves “did not our hearts burn within us?” (Luke 24:32). They meant: we
ought to have known. Our hearts were recognizing the truth, even while
we were resisting it.
But again, this sounds paradoxical. Does this mean that we ultimately
judge by brute reaction? We feel this is good, so we judge it good? Does
reason have no further role here? On the contrary. Just as in the case where
we are trying to understand people very different from us, there can be reasons to mistrust our reactions. Maybe some of the things we are induced
to do by our present ethical sense shock us or others in some way. Maybe
we have reason to think that our reactions are coming out of something
extraneous in us, that has no reason to be linked with a correct perception
of this good. Thus my satisfaction with my reaction to some challenge may
come not from a real perception of its rightness, but from a more narcissistic fulfilment: that I like the image of myself responding, giving the stinging rebuke to wrong-doing, for instance, or standing up with integrity.
We can come to liberate ourselves from these irrelevant reactions, and the
truer perception of what’s important that thereby emerges is all the more
convincing, because it comes out of such an error-reducing move.7
In other words, just having the feeling that X is important doesn’t resolve
the issue. Questions, puzzlement may remain; and they may be raised by
others. This hunch can’t be fully ratified as long as these questions remain,
and others disagree. The process of reasoning goes on. And this process
involves the two phases of reasoning we identified above. Partly, it involves a re-articulation of our original insight: for instance, to distinguish
what in it is really valid from what comes from narcissistic satisfaction.
And articulation of inchoate insights is the first phase of reason. And we
re-articulate in order to resolve anomalies and contradictions, which is the
second phase: the good insight seems to have bad fruits, or our feelings of
self-satisfaction are uncomfortably strong.
But without a perception which proceeds through a feeling of importance, there is no insight at all; neither the first off one which must face
objections, nor an eventually more satisfactory one which has answered
these. The whole process cannot go forward in disengaged mode.
The process of rational critique that I have just been describing is central to moral development. Moral growth involves, among other things, a
change in our emotional reactions to people, acts, predicaments, making
these reactions more accurate and insightful. But this doesn’t mean that
the standards which we aim at in this process are—or even could be—set
by an utterly disengaged form of rationality, such as might suffice to calculate utility consequences, or to check if a maxim could be coherently applied universally. The temptation to resort to such abstracted forms arises
from the mistaken belief that our sentiments are brute, non-cognitive,
7
I have talked about this kind of reasoning through transitions in “Explanation and Practical Reason”; see note 3.
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uninformed by insight, whether accurate or not. I will take up this error
in the next section.
Needless to say, the process of surmounting anomalies is never finished.
I remember going to see the film Cabaret, made on the basis of Christopher
Isherwood’s novel of late-Weimar Berlin. At one moment, a young man in
uniform stands in the street and sings a song, “Tomorrow Belongs to Me.”
To my horror, I felt my feelings being recruited, by the music, the singer’s
youth, his wonderful confidence. Am I becoming a Nazi? Well, no, but it
was an uncomfortable reminder: of lots of things, including how easily we
respond to certain appeals towards a beautiful future. And I also reflect:
I will not be a Nazi, because I have 20/20 hindsight where that leads. But
what if I had been a young German in Berlin in 1932?
All of the above shows the crucial link of reason with the “passions”: let
this term stand here for our perception of life meanings through feeling—
through the way that these meanings move us. Not seeing this is a fruit
of making the disengaged uses of reason the only ones that deserve the
name. So our two errors connect: the separation of reason and faith, and
the separation of reason from the passions which are inseparable from the
perceptions of certain meanings. There are certain domains where both
separations (more or less) work; and others where they are both crippling.
And we can see what distinguishes the two kinds.
3
Ideally, I would like to trace the origins of these connected errors: that of
“reason alone,” and that of a necessarily “dispassionate” reason. But unfortunately, there isn’t space for this massive task here. I will just be able to
take up the latter here, and relatively briefly, because the error is (perhaps)
easier to see through.
A widespread mistake in modern philosophy is to lose sight of the
distinction between an emotion and what might be called a sensation or
a “raw feel.” An emotion, like fear or despondency, joy or hopefulness,
involves a perception. The emotion is a response to its “intentional object,” and as such essentially involves a “take” on this object. I fear some
impending disaster, or I am despondent at some disappointing outcome
which has already befallen. The emotion is an apprehension of the object,
threatening or actually present, but in the register of feeling.
This contrasts with what I’m calling a sensation, like pain, or a tingling
in my foot, or the pleasurable feeling of entering a warm bath after trekking
through deep snow. Of course, you also perceive the bath, and perhaps the
cut which causes the pain, but these two are distinct. The sensation can be
exactly this feeling, an acute pain in my hand, for instance, even if one has
no idea what causes it. One rushes to a doctor to find out.
One of the distortions introduced by the modern objectified philosophical anthropology was to split emotion from its constituent perception,
and thus assimilate it to sensation. On this view, the fact that a given emotion attends a certain kind of event—despondency in face of a disaster, for
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instance—can be judged neither appropriate or inappropriate; it is just a
brute fact about us, like that fact that pain attends some kinds of changes
in our bodies, and not others, or that some substances cause nausea and
not others. The relation between event and affect is purely causal, and as
such contingent.
Thus Hume will argue, in one of the most fatefully influential passages
of his philosophy, that our moral sentiments are not ultimately grounded
in reason. It is just a brute fact about us that we respond with approbation
to what conduces to utility, ours or that of others. He is making a clear
rupture with the ethical tradition of the ancients, which saw the good as
an object of rational perception, an object which cannot be rightly perceived without being loved.
On this view, the rational perception of reality is by its very nature independent of our emotional reaction. It can proceed quite dispassionately.
Passion can disturb us, if it is too strong, or too subtly seductive of our
reasoning powers, but it cannot help.
But surely this mistrust of passion is not itself a modern error. Does it
not go back to the ancients, who in general did understand our emotions
correctly as perceptions in the register of feeling? Yes, but the mistrust of
passion didn’t involve a declaration of independence from all emotion.
Take the Stoics, for instance. They did declare all passions as illusions. But
they saw that these passions claimed the status of perceptions, that is, that
they involved “opinions” (doxai) about their objects. To fear something
was to see it as noxious. But the opinions intrinsic to the passions were all
false. We had to liberate ourselves from these erroneous views, and hence
of the passions which they animated.
But this didn’t mean that our perception of the true order of things was
utterly without affect. On the contrary, the correct grasp of things was
accompanied by joy (chara). In a similar way, the correct grasp of the Good
for Plato must move us to love it.
So the venerable doctrine that true rational understanding was “dispassionate” didn’t amount to the modern view that it was affect-free. This is
not to say that we will necessarily agree with the different traditional ways
in which “passion” has been defined and distinguished from the affect
inherent in the perception of truth. We couldn’t, of course, agree with all of
them, but we might well disagree with them all, and still not fall into the
crucial error of the moderns, which is to fail to see the intrinsic epistemic
content of emotion.
I invoked Hume above as the originator of the view that our moral
opinions are grounded ultimately in brute reactions. Now there are many
readings of Hume, and John Milbank has recently proposed another.8 The
one I am espousing here is the one which has made Hume a founding
8
Milbank’s essay, “Hume versus Kant: Faith, Reasoning and Feeling,” was given at the
“Faith, Rationality and the Passions” conference at which this paper was delivered. It is to be
published in the April 2011 issue of Modern Theology.
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thinker of modern naturalism. I’d like to spell out a bit more what this
reading involves.
The dominant tradition from the ancients sees ethical meanings as
discernible by reason. Some modes of action, together with the motives
inherent in them, are objectively higher; they are the object of a strong
evaluation. Examples are: Aristotle’s theôria, or else the citizen life, where
you exercise and perfect your phronésis. You are actuated by love of truth,
desire to know (theôria), or you seek honour, but also the common good.
But another example is the Christian vision of a life actuated by agape. Or
think of modern notions of career: aspiring to be a composer, writer, artist.
These higher modes of being can also be described in terms of virtues. To
have virtue is to be spontaneously disposed to act in the highest way from
the highest motives.
On this model, reason can discern the order of higher and lower activities. This is quite understandable with Aristotle and Plato, where reason is
precisely the faculty which can discern orders in things.
It follows that there is such a thing as getting it wrong. You fail to see
what is higher in the citizen life. Or you misidentify what makes the citizen life kalos (noble-beautiful). You think it’s just getting power, or fulfilling desires, or enjoying prestige.
There is a clear contrast with the reaction-triggering properties of things:
e.g., shit is nauseating. There is no such thing as rightly/wrongly identifying this property. You can be unusual in not finding excrement disturbing,
and/or in having nausea triggered by other things; but you can’t be wrong.
What nauseates is just a brute fact about you and other agents.
Now Hume denies this model. In the Inquiry, he poses the question
about the foundations of morals, “whether they be derived from Reason,
or from Sentiment.”9 His first answer is that both seem to have a case.
We do argue about moral issues, about right and wrong. But on the other
hand, it seems that
the final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions
amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which stamps on them
the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders
morality an active principle and constitutes virtue our happiness and vice our
misery: it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some internal
sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species.10

This sentiment, then, is the ultimate basis of morality. This is a brute
fact about us, not the deliverance of reason that we approve virtue and abhor vice. But this sentiment is quite different from our reaction of nausea,
because it is directed towards certain human qualities, and we sometimes
9
134 (170). See Hume’s “Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morality” in David Hume,
Enquiries, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd Edition (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1902 [reprinted
1970]). Numbers out of brackets refer to the sections in the text, those in parentheses to the
page number in this edition.
10
137 (172–173).
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need to reason in order to determine whether these hold or not in given
cases. The contrast case, for which I have chosen nausea as an example, is
represented for Hume by “some species of beauty, especially the natural
kinds, [which] on their first appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to
redress their influence, or adapt them better to our taste or sentiment.”11
But “in order to pave the way for [the moral] sentiment, and give a
proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much
reasoning should precede, and nice distinctions be made, just conclusions
drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and
general facts fixed and ascertained.”12
We thus have something here which is intermediary between, on one
hand, the Platonic-Aristotelian rational perception of a higher way of being, and, on the other, mere brute reactions. What, then, do we, as a matter
of brute fact, approve? Hume turns to examine this question, taking the
example of the “benevolent or softer affections . . . [which] wherever they
appear, engage the approbation and good will of mankind.”13 “No qualities are more entitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural
affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy
with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species.”14
Here he speaks of qualities “entitled to” our approbation, but this is
to speak with the vulgar, to offer an expression of our common sentiment rather than an ultimate justification. For Hume this sentiment can
be explained as a joint creation of two other motives which we universally
share: we value “utility,” that is, whatever conduces to life, health and
the fulfillment of (non-harmful) desire; and we experience sympathy for
other human beings. Utility alone makes us like beneficent acts of which
we are the object and dislike the disutilities imposed on us by others. But
utility in the context of sympathy induces us to respond positively to beneficence, and negatively to malefaction, whoever the recipients are or
may be. Here Hume is following Hutcheson and the Scottish tradition of
moral sense. Approbation and blame are distinct sentiments, immediately
recognizable as such, and different from liking and disliking. It is these
sentiments which can be explained (but not shown to be higher) by the
joint operation of utility and sympathy.
But just because it is the real occurrence and not just the semblance of beneficence which gains our approbation, there is always room for argument,
for probing, to establish that this object really exists in a particular case. Perhaps the supposed philanthropist is actually weaving some careful scheme
to bring the apparent beneficiary under his control. Perhaps what we take
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as a case of one man inflicting terrible pain on another turns out really to be
a surgeon removing a potentially fatal tumour. Our first off reactions can
be revised. This revisability explains certain historical changes in Hume’s
view. The ancients disapproved of “luxury, or a refinement on the pleasures
and conveniences of life,” because they thought it to be “the source of every
corruption in government, and the immediate cause of faction, sedition,
civil wars, and the total loss of liberty.” We moderns who now attempt to
prove “that such refinements rather tend to the increase of industry, civility, and arts regulate anew our moral as well as political sentiments, and
represent, as laudable or innocent, what had formerly been regarded as
pernicious and blameable.”15
That humans value utility goes without saying, but moral sentiments
show that our concern goes wider.
If usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness
be not always considered with a reference to self; it follows, that everything,
which contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to
our approbation and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great
part, for the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and
remote systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural?16

A footnote to this passage adds: “It is needless to push our researches so
far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It
is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature.
We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in
every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to
find any principle more general.”17
In other words, the positive evaluation of utility needs no explanation,
and sympathy is a brute fact about our nature. What need have we to look
further, for some supposedly rational insight which shows the love of the
general good to be “higher”? We can see right away that the conception
of reason has changed. The reason Hume invokes is not the discernment
of an order of higher and lower; it is reasoning about consequences. That
some character trait in fact conduces to the general utility, if this is sufficiently evident, is enough to explain why it is valued as a virtue. We
see this with the case of justice (Section III). With some virtues, we might
judge people by their intentions, rather than the actual results of their actions. This would be the case with benevolence, for instance. But then the
issue is what good results they were striving to encompass.
The reason involved here is instrumental reason, what causes what? In
particular, what brings about utility for human beings in general, severally and individually? Its relevance to our motivation is no longer the same
as with Plato and Aristotle. For them, the reason discerning order was
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thought to motivate us to live up to this order. Indeed, we can’t really be
said to grasp the order if we are not appropriately moved by it. But with
Hume, we now have a perception of causal relations which by itself would
be motivationally inert. What it lacks as a motivating force is precisely a
desire to encompass certain ends, which would set us about producing the
means. That is the ultimate principle which Hume invokes. Reason establishes “factual” connections. These are motivationally inert. So what can
move us, if not “some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made
universal in the whole species. For what else can have an influence of this
nature?”18 This is the ultimate clincher. Or as Hume put it in the Treatise
(2.3.3.4): “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”
So Hume (a) eliminates reason as a perception of higher/lower, and (b)
refocuses reason as the enquiry into what makes for utility. One can see
how this outlook by a slight shift could mutate into Benthamite utilitarianism. And indeed, Bentham credits Hume as his major inspiration in the
introduction to his Principles of Morals and Legislation. We simply start from
the obvious importance of utility, and the fact of sympathy, and then we can
ask: what else might justify any act as the right one, other than its having
the greatest utility consequences? For any rival criterion has been displaced
from the scene, and especially the outmoded ancient theories of virtue.
4
So a concatenation of errors has contributed to a Wittgensteinian picture
which has “held us captive.”19 The powerful model of natural science has
convinced many that true knowledge of the world has to be in “neutral”
terms, that is, in terms which are purged of human meanings. Theoretical
reason must operate in such a purified mode. But this means that practical reason cannot find the grounds for action in a world of “facts” alone.
“Neutral” facts, by definition, can’t tell us what we should do. They can
only guide us once we have espoused certain goals, in the light of which
these facts can become relevant to action. But since theoretical reason cannot establish these goals, they must come from ourselves, from our de facto
inclinations. A neutral world is given practical shape by the “values” that
human agents project onto it. Our values may arise from “faith,” and they
will almost certainly engage us emotionally, except in the most trivial contexts. But both faith and feeling can’t arise in reason. They can only guide
practical, that is, instrumental reason as ungrounded premises. The very
possibility of a close relation between reason, faith and feeling becomes invisible. And so it remains for great numbers among our contemporaries.
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